Mr. Neroni and his dangerous questions. Question No. 2. Why revocation of crocodillian permit is given more protection in New York than revocation of a law license

In his lawsuit Neroni v Zayas brought on February 2, 2013 in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of New York, Case No. 3:13-cv-127-LEK-DEP, my husband Mr. Neroni raised the following equal protection/declaratory judgment challenge - totally ignored by the court:

Why proceedings to revoke the occupational license of an attorney are considered court proceedings and proceedings to revoke any other occupational licenses in New York are considered administrative proceedings?

The question is not idle, and it is not by chance that federal court chose to ignore the question.

The question is simply too dangerous because, if answered, it would have undone all the carefully constructed system of attorney disciplinary proceedings as a feeding grounds for private attorneys to drum up business and eliminate competition behind closed doors.

After all, a rose by any name is a rose, right?

So, if a proceeding bears all the attributes of administrative proceedings - from its nature (occupational license revocation) to functions of the actors (the licensing agency acts as a prosecutor, legislator and adjudicator), to availability of discovery to the accused (discovery is not available in disciplinary proceedings).

These attributes equally describe proceedings to revoke a crocodillian permit (there is such an occupational license in New York - to handle and breed crocodiles), and proceedings to revoke a law license.

Simply because the licensing agency allowed to issue law licenses is called a "court", does not mean that anything that court does is judicial.

The reason why the federal court carefully ignored the challenge was because the set of procedural protections for revocation of ANY other occupational license but the law license in New York are vastly different than in revocation of a law license - for no apparent reason, which IS an equal protection problem.

After all,

revocation of any other occupational license but the law license:

1. Starts in an administrative agency;
2. Starts as an executive administrative proceeding;
3. Is entitled to an appeal within the administrative agency - as of right;
4. Is entitled to a court proceedings to undo the decision of the administrative agency - called an Article 78 proceedings - as of right;
5. Is entitled to two levels of appeal in court proceedings - to the intermediate appellate court and to the Court of Appeals.
6. And - THE BIGGER!  The initial revocation of the license by the administrative agency is not entitled to the Rooker-Feldman bar in federal court.

As compared, revocation of a law license, being also an executive function BY ITS NATURE, no matter whether the license issuing and revoking agency is called "a court" or not, is handled in 

1. Intermediate appellate court - with NO right of appellate review other than
2. Limited review by the NYS Court of Appeals on constitutional grounds which usually end in a one-sentence dismissal claiming that there was no "substantial" violation of constitutional rights.

• No intermediate administrative appeal.
• No Article 78 proceedings.
• No appeal to the intermediate appellate court.
• Law license revocation is treated by federal courts as a final court judgement precluding any review in federal courts through the Rooker-Feldman bar.

THREE procedural stages are skipped, and a federal review of an administrative-in-nature decision is barred.

So, Mr. Neroni asked - WHY revocation of a crocodillian permit is given four times more procedural protection than revocation of a law license that requires a lot more and a lot more expensive training and investment?

There was no answer, not even a recognition that such a claim was made.

The case was dismissed without even mentioning that claim.

Instead of reviewing this clearly stated claim, the court engaged in plaintiff-bashing (after paying lip service to the "standard of review" requiring the court to give all favorable inferences TO the plaintiff's pleadings):

The court claimed that Mr. Neroni's lawsuit is:

• "lengthy;
• convoluted;
• digressive;
• redundant" - Dkt. 46, p. 1

 The court claimed that Mr. Neroni causes of action where, of course, "ill-defined", Dkt. 46, p. 4.

The court claimed that Mr. Neroni's claim (this claim) was a "rambling assemblage of words", Dkt. 46, p. 10.

You be judges as to how "rambling" was the "assemblage of words" that the court deemed too dangerous to even consider.

Had the "assemblage" been properly considered by the court, a declaratory judgment that attorney disciplinary proceedings in New York are administrative in nature and no independent judicial review whatsoever is given to attorneys when their law licenses are revoked, could have led to a revolution in how attorneys are regulated, long before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission (decided in February of 2015) and long before appointment of the useless and conflict-ridden Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline. 

But, changing the status quo is not in the plans of those who benefit - including financially, big time - from that status quo, and that includes members of attorney disciplinary committees and the courts who hold attorney independence in a death grip and practically force attorneys to finance judicial campaigns in order to gain their favor.

Mr. Neroni's civil rights lawsuit is now on appeal.

We'll see whether the usually octogenarian 3-judge appellate panel of the 2nd Circuit will have enough energy to read the record and recognize the claim.

Stay tuned.